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Abstract
The browser history reveals highly sensitive informa-
tion about users, such as financial status, health condi-
tions, or political views. Private browsing modes and
anonymity networks are consequently important tools
to preserve the privacy not only of regular users but
in particular of whistleblowers and dissidents. Yet, in
this work we show how a malicious application can in-
fer opened websites from Google Chrome in Incognito
mode and from Tor Browser by exploiting hardware per-
formance events (HPEs). In particular, we analyze the
browsers’ microarchitectural footprint with the help of
advanced Machine Learning techniques: k-th Nearest
Neighbors, Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines,
and in contrast to previous literature also Convolutional
Neural Networks. We profile 40 different websites, 30
of the top Alexa sites and 10 whistleblowing portals, on
two machines featuring an Intel and an ARM processor.
By monitoring retired instructions, cache accesses, and
bus cycles for at most 5 seconds, we manage to classify
the selected websites with a success rate of up to 86.3%.
The results show that hardware performance events can
clearly undermine the privacy of web users. We therefore
propose mitigation strategies that impede our attacks and
still allow legitimate use of HPEs.
1 Introduction
Web browsers are indispensable components in our lives.
They provide access to news and entertainment, and
more importantly serve as a platform through which we
perform privacy and security sensitive interactions such
as online banking, web enabled healthcare, and social
networking. Knowing the websites a user is visiting
therefore reveals personal and highly sensitive informa-
tion. To preserve the privacy of users, browsers conse-
quently implement private browsing or incognito modes,
which leave no traces of visited websites. More com-
prehensive protection is achieved by Onion routing, e.g.
Tor, which protects users against Internet surveillance by
obscuring packet routing information. By using a Tor
enabled browser users may hide the websites they visit
from adversaries monitoring their network communica-
tion. This has become indispensable for whistleblowers
and dissidents who try to protect their identity against
powerful corporations and repressive governments. Be-
sides web browsers, other tools have emerged to mask
the identity of the user, e.g. Signal/Redphone, Silent
Phone, and Telegram. However, even the installation of
such tools can be viewed as subversive action by a re-
pressive regime. In contrast, privacy preserving browsers
come pre-installed on many platforms.
While browsers have significantly matured in provid-
ing privacy assurances, they are still far from perfect.
For instance, an adversary can still infer web browsing
activity by exploiting microarchitectural leakages at the
hardware level. In 2012, Jana and Shmatikov [27] found
that memory footprints of processes are unique and that
they can be used to detect opened websites. In 2015, Liu
et al. [38] demonstrated how the entire last-level cache
of a processor can be profiled, which Oren et al. [43]
leveraged to infer a small set of opened websites. The
key to such inference attacks is that most applications
exhibit different execution behavior depending on the in-
put they are processing. They consequently stress the
processor hardware in different ways. Whichever appli-
cation is able to observe these load patterns can learn a
great deal of what is being processed in other programs.
What eventually enables real-world attacks is that many
of the applications we use every day run in the back-
ground. Users trust these applications, even though they
have little control over what is executed by third-parties.
In this work, we show that it is feasible for such a
third-party application to collect data using hardware
performance events (HPEs) and infer private user ac-
tivity across application boundaries. In particular, we
demonstrate that it is possible to infer opened websites,
even when users browse in Incognito mode or with the
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Tor Browser. Such malicious behavior is facilitated in
modern operating systems, as HPEs can often be moni-
tored from user space. For the experiments in this work,
we use the perf subsystem of the Linux kernel. Since
HPE based information is incidental and often noisy, ad-
vanced methods for data analysis are needed. The recent
advances in Machine Learning (ML) provide us with a
powerful tool to classify the complex noisy data in an ef-
fective manner. We show that while k-th Nearest Neigh-
bors, Support Vector Machines, and Decision Trees are
not sufficient to classify the complex and noisy observed
data into a high number of different classes, Convolu-
tional Neural Networks, a Deep Learning technique, can
efficiently extract meaningful data even in the presence
of severe noise. As a result, we demonstrate that a ma-
licious user space process can infer the web activity of
users with very high success rates and in a highly auto-
mated fashion.
Our Contribution. In summary, we
• employ advanced Machine Learning techniques, in-
cluding Convolutional Neural Networks, and com-
pare their efficiency,
• use perf to access different types of hardware per-
formance events and combine them to get a better
classification rate,
• cover 40 different websites, including 30 of the top
Alexa sites and 10 whistleblowing portals,
• detect different web pages of a domain to show that
fine-grained browser profiling is possible,
• demonstrate that the attacker does not need to pre-
cisely synchronize with the browser, as misalign-
ment is compensated by the ML techniques,
• show that it suffices to monitor Google Chrome and
Tor Browser for at most 5 seconds to classify web-
sites with high accuracy, and
• outline possible mitigation strategies that impede
website inference while still allowing access to per-
formance profiling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides background information and related work
for hardware performance events, machine learning tech-
niques, and website fingerprinting. Section 3 explains
how we measure HPEs, and Section 4 describes the pro-
filing scenarios. Section 5 discusses our installments of
the ML techniques, before Section 6 presents the results
of our experiments. A further discussion of the results is
given in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 describes mitiga-
tion strategies and Section 9 concludes this work.
2 Background and Related Work
This section provides background information and re-
lated work regarding Machine Learning techniques,
hardware performance events, and website fingerprint-
ing. Subsequently, we briefly compare our work to pre-
vious ones.
2.1 Machine Learning Techniques
Machine Learning provides powerful tools to automate
the process of understanding and extracting relevant in-
formation from noisy observations. All of the tech-
niques we use in this work are supervised, meaning that
known samples (training set) are used to derive a model
that is subsequently employed to classify unknown sam-
ples (test set). The success rate of an ML technique
in an experiment denotes the percentage of unknown
samples that are classified correctly. To reliably deter-
mine the success rate, classification is performed mul-
tiple times with different training and test sets that are
derived through statistical sampling. This is called cross-
validation and is especially useful, if the number of over-
all samples is low. A brief description of the four ML
techniques we use in our experiments is given in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
k-th Nearest Neighbor (kNN). The main purpose of
kNN is to find the training sample that is closest to a
test sample. The Euclidean distance is used to determine
how far training and test samples are apart. The smallest
distance is taken as the first nearest neighbor and the test
sample is marked with the corresponding label [59]. As
an example, Gong et al. [18] showed that kNN could be
applied to infer websites using remote traffic analysis.
Decision Tree (DT). Decision Trees are used to clas-
sify samples by creating branches for the given data fea-
tures. The general method to decide on the boundaries is
to find the feature which gives the best split among the
classes. The child branches are then created with other
features. While choosing the values for each branch, the
entropy is computed to optimize the values. Decision
Trees are used by Demme et al. [15] to detect malware in
Intel and ARM processors with HPEs.
Support Vector Machine (SVM). In SVM based
learning, input data is converted to a multi-dimensional
representation by using mapping functions. Hyper-
planes are then created to classify the data. The clas-
sification strategy is to find the optimal decision bound-
aries between classes by increasing the distance between
them [12]. Gulmezoglu et al. [22] showed that SVM
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can be applied in a noisy environment to detect appli-
cations that are running in virtual machines on Amazon
EC2 cloud.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). Convolu-
tional Neural Networks are one of the most popular Deep
Learning techniques that has been proven successful in
numerous applications. In contrast to the other ML tech-
niques, CNNs automatically determine important fea-
tures of the input data. This is achieved by creating nodes
between higher and lower dimensional mappings of the
input data. The meaningful features are then extracted
by finding the optimal functions for each node. When
the test data is fed into the CNN, the highest probability
is taken as the predicted label [19]. In 2016, Maghrebi
et al. [40] showed that Deep Learning techniques could
be applied in side-channel attacks to recover secret infor-
mation from cryptographic implementations.
2.2 Hardware Performance Events
The microarchitectures of modern processors implement
a large spectrum of performance enhancing features that
speed up memory accesses and code execution. As a
compromise, performance enhancements introduce in-
put dependent runtimes and weak separation between
executing applications. For critical software and mutu-
ally untrusted users, this raises severe security and pri-
vacy concerns that have been addressed in literature for
more than two decades. Kocher [32] first describes tim-
ing attacks on software implementations of cryptosys-
tems and provides an early anticipation of memory hi-
erarchies, branching units, and variable-time instructions
being further exploited. Literature subsequently showed
that data and instruction caches [1, 53], branch predic-
tion units [2], and arithmetic logic units [3] can indeed
be targeted in attacks. All of them are evidence that
the microarchitectural state of a processor contains cru-
cial information about the processes that are executed on
it. Hardware performance events are an interface to this
state that is implemented on most modern processors. A
dedicated piece of hardware, the performance monitor-
ing unit (PMU), is responsible to keep track of microar-
chitectural events that occur while executing code on
the processor. These events include, e.g., instruction re-
tirements, branch mispredictions, and cache references.
They provide a comprehensive picture of a processor’s
runtime behavior and are therefore interesting for adver-
saries and developers alike. In general, HPEs are use-
ful for application profiling [5], debugging [20, 62], and
even load balancing [44]. However, the high level of
details contained in HPEs also introduces security and
privacy issues. Clock cycle events have been recog-
nized as a vital timing source for a large class of cache-
based attacks [37, 64]. In particular, Uhsadel et al. [54]
demonstrate that cache miss and clock cycle events can
be used to mount attacks on software implementations of
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Bhattacharya
and Mukhopadhyay [9] show that branch mispredictions
during RSA decryptions reveal the secret exponent be-
cause of conditional branches in the multiplication rou-
tine during modular exponentiation. In contrast, HPEs
have improved our understanding of attacks [7, 52], fa-
cilitated the evaluation of software components [63], and
helped to analyze malware samples [60]. They have also
been leveraged to reverse-engineer cache internals on
modern processors [42] and to construct random num-
ber generators [41, 48]. A large class of previous work
is dedicated to the real time detection of attacks and
malware infections, a selection of which relies on Ma-
chine Learning and related techniques. In particular,
naive Bayes [46], probabilistic Markov models [30], k-
Nearest Neighbors [15], Decision Trees [15,30,46], Ran-
dom Forests [15], Support Vector Machines [8, 50], and
(Artificial) Neural Networks [13, 15, 46] are studied.
2.3 Website Fingerprinting
The protection of the browser history is important to en-
sure the privacy of web users. Yet, literature offers a
large spectrum of history stealing attacks that allow to
recover entries of previously visited websites. Most of
them can be launched by malicious web servers and rely
on caching [17] and rendering [34] of website elements,
visited URL styles [26], and user interactions [58]. In ad-
dition, attacks have also been demonstrated on the client
side in the form of malicious browser extensions [51].
If no browsing history is stored, e.g. in private brows-
ing modes, it is still possible to detect websites a user
is actively visiting. This is investigated in the field of
website fingerprinting, to which we contribute with this
work. The following paragraphs discuss different attack
vectors for website fingerprinting.
Network based. A significant fraction of website fin-
gerprinting literature is dedicated to network traffic anal-
ysis. Attacks typically require an adversary to sniff net-
work communication between the web server and the
client machine. Most of the previous works tolerate en-
crypted traffic, e.g., generated by SSL/TLS or SSH con-
nections, and some even work with anonymized traf-
fic, e.g., routed over the Tor network. To fingerprint
and classify websites, previous works have employed
a variety of mathematical techniques, many of which
are related to Machine Learning. In particular, the Jac-
card Index [47, 49], multinomial naive-Bayes [24], co-
sine similarity [45], Levenshtein distances and related
metrics [11, 39, 57], k-th Nearest Neighbours [56], Deci-
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sion Trees [29], Random Forests [23], and Support Vec-
tor Machines [57] are studied.
Browser/OS based. Website fingerprinting that targets
the browser or the underlying operating system typically
requires to execute malicious code, e.g. JavaScript, on
the client machine. Through this attack vector, Gruss
et al. [21] infer opened websites by targeting the mem-
ory deduplication feature of modern operating systems
and hypervisors. Kim et al. [31] exploit the Quota Man-
agement API of modern browsers. The authors recover
opened websites via storage profiles, which they obtain
by continuously reading the remaining space in the tem-
porary storage. Vila and Ko¨pf [55] employ a similar
strategy by timing tasks in shared event loops that han-
dle user interactions on all opened websites. A differ-
ent approach is proposed by Jana and Shmatikov [28],
who measure the memory footprint of browsers that is
available through the procfs filesystem in Linux. The
authors show that different websites exhibit different
footprints and subsequently recover opened websites by
comparing their footprints to previously recorded ones.
Hardware based. The third attack vector for website
fingerprinting leverages properties of the hardware that
runs the web browser. Attacks are mounted by mali-
cious code within the browser, by other processes on the
same system, or by an external adversary with physical
access to the device. Oren et al. [43] demonstrate that
websites exhibit different profiles in the processor cache
that can be observed from JavaScript. Hornby [25] also
fingerprints websites via the cache, but from another pro-
cess that is running on the same processor as the web
browser. Lee et al. [33] demonstrate that websites can
be inferred from rendering traces that are retained in
GPUs. The authors obtained these traces with a separate
process that is running on the same system as the web
browser. Booth [10] demonstrates that website finger-
prints can also be constructed from the CPU load. The
author stresses processor cores via JavaScript and indi-
rectly measures the load of the system that is caused by
other opened websites. Experiments are done using kNN
classification and dynamic time warping comparisons.
Clark et al. [14] measure the power consumption of lap-
top and desktop systems and attribute different power
profiles to different websites. The authors use Support
Vector Machines to classify websites. Yang et al. [61]
extends this idea to mobile devices that are charged via
USB. The authors use Random Forests for website clas-
sification.
2.4 Our Work
Similar to Hornby [25] and Lee et al. [33], we as-
sume that a malicious application is running on the same
processor as the web browser. In contrast to previ-
ous hardware based website fingerprinting, we leverage
more than just the processor cache [43] or the proces-
sor load [10]. To the best of our knowledge, this work
is the first that investigates hardware performance events
in the context of website fingerprinting. In compliance
with the state of the art in this field, we employ super-
vised Machine Learning techniques in the form of k-
Nearest Neighbors, Decision Trees, and Support Vec-
tor Machines. While these are recognized instruments
for network based fingerprinting, their application to
hardware based website inference attacks is still frag-
mented [10, 14, 61]. In this work, we directly compare
their effectiveness in multiple practical scenarios. In ad-
dition, we demonstrate that Deep Learning (in the form
of Convolutional Neural Networks) outperforms tradi-
tional Machine Learning techniques that are established
in both hardware performance event and website finger-
printing literature. To the best of our knowledge, CNNs
have not been investigated in neither of these fields be-
fore.
3 Monitoring Hardware Performance
Events
The performance monitoring unit (PMU), which is re-
sponsible for counting hardware performance events, im-
plements a set of counters that can each be configured to
count events of a certain type. The number of available
events is often considerably larger than the number of
available counters. Consequently, only a limited number
of events can be counted in parallel. In order to mea-
sure more events, software layers that use the PMU typ-
ically implement time multiplexing. All experiments in
this work succeed by measuring only as many events as
hardware counters are available, i.e., time multiplexing
is not needed. Access to PMUs is typically restricted to
privileged, i.e., kernel or system level code, but interfaces
exist through which user space applications can gather
event counts. On Unix and Linux based operating sys-
tems, PAPI [35] or perf [36] interfaces are commonly
implemented. In this work, we focus on the perf inter-
face that is mainly found on Linux systems. Note that
this work demonstrates the general feasibility of website
fingerprinting with HPEs. Therefore, similar results are
also expected on systems with other HPE interfaces.
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3.1 Profiling with Perf
The perf event monitoring subsystem was added to the
Linux kernel in version 2.6.31 and subsequently made
available to the user space via the perf event open
system call. Listing 1 shows the system call signature.
int perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr,
pid_t pid, int cpu,
int group_fd,
unsigned long flags);
Listing 1: perf event open system call signature [36].
The perf event attr is the main configuration ob-
ject. It determines the type of event that should be
counted and defines a wide range of acquisition prop-
erties. We focus only on a very limited number of set-
tings and use zero values for all others. This renders
our measurements to be reproducible on a larger num-
ber of systems. The type field in perf event attr
specifies the generic event type. As we focus on hard-
ware based events, we only use PERF TYPE HARDWARE
or PERF TYPE HW CACHE. The config field determines
the actual event type. The event selection used in this
work is given in Section 4. In addition, we set the
exclude kernel option, which avoids counting kernel
activity. This improves the applicability of our mea-
surement code, because kernel profiling is prohibited on
some systems. Finally, the size field is set to the size
of the event attribute struct. The pid and cpu parame-
ters are used to set the scope of the event profiling. In
this work, we focus on two profiling scenarios: process-
specific and core-wide. To limit event counting to a sin-
gle process, pid is set to the process identifier and cpu
is set to -1. Subsequently, events are counted only for
the given process, but on any processor core. To enable
core-wide counting, cpu is set to the core number that
should be observed and pid is set to -1. Events are then
counted only on one processor core, but for all processes
running on it. The group fd parameter is used to signal
that a selection of events belongs to a group. The perf
system then counts all members of a group as a unit.
Since this is not a strict requirement for our approach,
we omit group fd and set it to -1. The flags param-
eter is used to configure advanced settings including the
behavior when spawning new processes and monitoring
Linux control groups (cgroups). As none of the settings
are relevant to our measurement scenarios, we set flags
to zero.
Once perf event open succeeds, the returned file
descriptor can be used to read and reset event counts, and
to enable and disable counting. In our measurements, we
read event counts using the standard read system call.
We found this to yield a sufficiently high sampling fre-
quency and subsequently high success rates during web-
site fingerprinting. On our test systems, the duration of
the read system call ranges between 1.5 µs and 3.0 µs
when reading one counter value.
Access Control. On Linux, access to perf can be
configured for user space applications. The access
level is specified as an integer value that is stored
in /proc/sys/kernel/perf event paranoid in the
procfs filesystem. A negative value grants user space
applications full access to performance profiling. If the
paranoid level is set to 0, comprehensive profiling of
the kernel activity is prohibited. A value of 1 prevents
user space applications from core-wide event counting
(pid = -1, cpu≥ 0). A paranoid level of 2 prohibits
process-specific event counts while the application gives
control to kernel space, e.g., during a system call. Val-
ues above 2 deny event counting even in user space and
essentially deactivate perf for user space applications.
Note that the paranoid setting is typically overridden
by applications started with the CAP SYS ADMIN capabil-
ity, e.g., programs started by the root user.
4 Browser Profiling Scenarios
We investigate the inference of opened websites via
HPEs in three distinct scenarios hosted on two Linux
test systems. As we are relying on the standardized
perf event open system call of the Linux kernel, there
is no need to change the measurement code when switch-
ing between systems. The following paragraphs describe
each scenario in more detail.
1.) Google Chrome on ARM. In this scenario, we pro-
file the Google Chrome browser (v55.0.2883) with de-
fault options on an ARM Cortex-A53 processor. While
the browser loads websites, a malicious user space appli-
cation is measuring six hardware performance events. In
particular, we acquire HW INSTRUCTIONS, HW BRANCH -
INSTRUCTIONS, HW CACHE REFERENCES, L1 DCACHE -
LOADS, L1 ICACHE LOADS, and HW BUS CYCLES events.
This selection of events covers instruction retirements,
cache accesses, and external memory interfaces. It gives
a comprehensive view of the microarchitectural load the
browser is putting on the processor. The selected events
are measured core-wide, hence including noise from
other processes and background activity of the operat-
ing system. Since we want to assess the feasibility of
core-wide profiling, the browser process is bound to the
measured processor core. The events are then measured
for five seconds.
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2.) Google Chrome (Incognito) on Intel. In this sce-
nario, we profile Google Chrome in Incognito mode
with default options on an Intel i5-2430M proces-
sor. The malicious user space application is measur-
ing three hardware performance events, namely HW -
BRANCH INSTRUCTIONS, HW CACHE REFERENCES, and
LLC LOADS. In contrast to the ARM scenario, the
malicious application acquires process-specific events.
Hence, the browser processes float on all processor cores.
Since the Intel platform only features three configurable
hardware counters, not all of the events measured on
ARM can be considered. Compared to the overall retired
instructions, we found the retired branch instructions to
yield more usable information. As the browser processes
are not bound to one core anymore, we substitute events
related to the L1 cache with last-level cache loads. In ad-
dition, the bus cycle event is omitted, because it is nois-
ier on the Intel platform. The selected events are then
measured for one second specifically for the rendering
process of the opened website.
3.) Tor Browser on Intel. In this scenario, we profile
the Tor Browser (v6.5.1, based on Firefox v45.8.0) on the
same Intel platform as before. In contrast to Chrome, the
Tor Browser renders all tabs in one process, which is pro-
filed by the malicious application. While the same per-
formance events are observed, the measurement duration
is prolonged. This is because the Tor network introduces
significant delays while opening websites.
Synchronization. None of the scenarios require strict
synchronization between the browser and the process of
the adversary. Small misalignment is simply passed on
to the Machine Learning step. Therefore, we only in-
vestigate simple synchronization techniques that can be
achieved in practice. For Google Chrome on Intel, the
adversary scans the running processes twice per second
and checks whether a new rendering process has been
spawned. Once a new process is detected, the adver-
sary starts to measure the corresponding process-specific
events. The Tor Browser, in contrast, is started freshly
for every opened website. The adversary again checks
all running processes twice per second and once the
Tor Browser is detected, the process-specific profiling is
started. This includes additional noise as the browser
startup phase is also captured. In the ARM scenario,
the measurements are precisely aligned with the start of
loading a website. This is used to investigate whether
more precise alignment yields better results. Such a trig-
ger signal could be derived from a sudden change or
characteristic pattern in the event counts, as the load of
the system changes when a website is opened.
5 Usage of Machine Learning Techniques
After the hardware performance events have been ac-
quired, the measurements for every event are concate-
nated to create the input data for the Machine Learning
techniques. Both training and test sets are normalized to
reduce the computation time. Cross-validation is used to
obtain reliable success rates. All algorithms are imple-
mented in Matlab 2017a and run on a standard dual-core
Intel processor. The training phase of the Convolutional
Neural Network is reduced with the help of an NVIDIA
Tesla K20 GPU accelerator. Further implementation de-
tails of the Machine Learning techniques are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
k-th Nearest Neighbor (kNN). The fitcknn command
is used to implement kNN and to train our model. By
default, the prior probabilities are the respective relative
frequencies of the classes in the data, which are initially
set to be equal to each other. The Euclidean metric is
used to determine the distance between classes.
Decision Tree (DT). For the Decision Tree, the fitctree
command is used to train the model. The default values
for maximum split is N-1 where N denotes the number
of classes. For the training phase, the minimum leaf size
is 1 and the minimum parent size is 10.
Support Vector Machine (SVM). We use
libsvm [12] in our experiments to implement multi-
class Support Vector Machines. The model is created
and trained based on a linear SVM. In general, the
type of the SVM can be set to C-SVC or v-SVC. The
parameter C is used to regularize the mapping function,
whereas the parameter v denotes the upper and lower
bound of the fraction of the training error. In our
experiments, we chose C-SVC.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). We choose
two autoencoders to classify our measurements into N
classes. In each autoencoder, different levels of abstrac-
tion are learned from the feature vectors and mapped to a
lower dimensional space. While the number of layers in
the first autoencoder is 100 ·N, the second autoencoder
has 10 ·N layers. The maximum number of iterations is
set to 400 and L2 weight regularization is set to 0.001 for
both autoencoders. The last layer is the softmax layer.
The training data is trained in a supervised fashion using
labels. After the neural network is established and first
classification results are obtained, the accuracy of the
multilayer network model is improved using backprop-
agation and repeated training using labeled data. While
6
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Website Number
0
20
40
60
80
100
Su
cc
es
s 
Ra
te
 (%
)
Figure 1: SVM success rates per website for Google
Chrome on ARM. The dashed line shows the average
classification rate of 84%.
CNNs have many advantages, the most important disad-
vantage is their memory demands. When we run out of
GPU memory, we downsample the input data to reduce
the length of the feature vectors.
6 Website Profiling Results
In each of the profiling scenarios described in Section 4,
we monitor HPEs for 30 of the most visited websites
according to Alexa [4] (excluding adult sites). This se-
lection is listed in Appendix A (1-30) and used to illus-
trate the general effectiveness of the Machine Learning
techniques to classify websites based on hardware per-
formance events. To demonstrate that also fine-grained
website classification is feasible, 10 different sub-pages
of the Amazon.com domain are monitored in Google
Chrome on Intel. Finally, a selection of whistleblowing
websites is measured when visited with the Tor browser.
They are also listed in Appendix A (31-40).
6.1 Google Chrome on ARM
For the experiments on ARM, each website is monitored
20 times to train the models. In turn, each measurement
consists of 25,000 samples per hardware performance
event, which are concatenated for all six events to yield a
final measurement size of 150,000 samples. For 30 web-
sites, the total training data size is therefore 90 ·106 sam-
ples. Based on this training set, the success rates after
cross-validation are 84% for linear SVM, 80% for kNN,
and less than 50% for DT and CNN. The low success
rates of DT and CNN indicate that not enough samples
have been acquired. Figure 1 illustrates the classifica-
tion rates for each of the visited websites when classified
with SVM. Since the number of samples collected in this
scenario is small, 10-fold cross-validation is used. The
lowest detection rate is 70%, which shows that core-wide
profiling is still feasible even in the presence of noise and
background system activity. The average classification
rate of 84% is shown as a dashed line in the figure.
6.2 Google Chrome (Incognito) on Intel
For the Google Chrome experiments on Intel, the num-
ber of measurements per website is increased to 50. As
more samples are acquired, fixed training and test sets are
derived instead of using cross-validation. Out of the 50
observations, 40 are used for the training phase whereas
10 are collected to test the derived models. Since each
website is monitored for only 1 second, every measure-
ment now consists of 10,000 samples per event. With
three observed events, this yields a total training set size
of 36 ·106 and a test set size of 9 ·106 samples.
Figure 2(a) shows the success rates over an increas-
ing number of training measurements for all Machine
Learning techniques and Google Chrome in Incognito
mode. Clearly, CNN achieve the highest classification
rate, if enough training samples are available. In par-
ticular, the success rate for 40 training observations per
website is 86.3%. If the training data size is small, SVM
and kNN achieve similar success rates as CNN. Due to
the large size of feature vectors in the training and test
data, DT gives lower success rates than other ML tech-
niques. Regarding the computation effort, the training
phase of CNN takes 2 hours on a GPU and is conse-
quently the longest among the Machine Learning tech-
niques. In contrast, the test phase takes approximately 1
minute for every ML technique.
The second experiment for Google Chrome in Incog-
nito mode on Intel assumes that an adversary has de-
tected a website that the user has visited. Consequently,
the attacker tries to infer which page of the website the
user is looking at. To illustrate the feasibility of this at-
tack, we selected 10 pages of the Amazon.com domain
that display different sections of the online store (kitchen,
bedroom, etc.). Naturally, this scenario is more challeng-
ing, as the difference between web pages of the same do-
main is smaller than for entirely different websites. Nev-
ertheless, it is still possible to correctly classify the vis-
ited web pages with moderate success. This is illustrated
in Figure 2(b). When using CNN and SVM, the success
rate is 64%. kNN yields 60% success rate, while DT
drops to 52%.
For CNN and SVM, we also investigate the success
rates when the number of guesses are increased. This is
shown in Figure 3(a). If the first 5 result classes are con-
sidered, websites can be detected with 99% accuracy for
SVM and CNN. Similar results are obtained for the same
domain experiments, where both CNN and SVM yield
92% accuracy. Relaxing the number of guesses therefore
significantly improves the success rates.
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Figure 2: Success rate vs. number of training measure-
ments for Google Chrome (Incognito) and (a) 30 differ-
ent websites (b) 10 same domain web pages.
6.3 Tor Browser on Intel
For the Tor Browser experiments on Intel, the same
events are observed and the same number of measure-
ments are taken for each website. Again, 40 of those
measurements are used to construct the training set,
while 10 measurement form the test set. As the Tor
Browser is monitored for 5 seconds, 50,000 samples are
acquired for each event and website. This yields 150,000
samples for one measurement, 180 · 106 samples for the
entire training set, and 45 ·106 samples for the test set.
Similar to the Google Chrome experiments on Intel,
Figure 4(a) shows the success rates over an increasing
number of training measurements for all Machine Learn-
ing techniques and Tor Browser. CNN yields the highest
success rate of 71%. While SVM and kNN have similar
success rates around 66%, Decision Tree yields a lower
accuracy of 60%. The results show that CNN can handle
noisy data and misalignment problems better than other
methods, since CNN learns the relations between traces.
The experiment for 10 web pages on Amazon.com is
repeated for the Tor Browser and the results are illus-
trated in Figure 4(b). In contrast to the Google Chrome
results, Decision Tree yields the highest success rate of
59%. We believe the reason is the small number of
classes that increases the efficiency of DT. The remain-
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Figure 3: Number of guesses vs. classification rate
for (a) Google Chrome (Incognito) and (b) Tor Browser.
Solid line represents results for Alexa Top 30, while the
dashed line illustrates the same domain results.
ing algorithms classify the same domain web pages with
a similar success rate of approximately 49%. Also, Fig-
ure 3(b) shows the success rates for CNN and SVM over
an increasing number of guesses. While the random se-
lection success rate is around 16% for 5 guesses, CNN
achieves a success rate of 94%. For the same domain
web pages, the success rate of CNN 88% for 5 guesses.
SVM achieves slightly worse results. Slightly increasing
the number of guesses thus yields a significant increase
in classification success.
Finally, we investigate whistleblowing websites, since
visiting them anonymously is one of the important rea-
sons to use Tor Browser. For the experiments, we select
10 websites from [6], which are given in Appendix A. In
the first step, these whistleblowing websites are classi-
fied using all ML techniques. While CNN yields the best
classification rate of 84%, SVM exhibits a success rate
of 78%. In contrast, DT and kNN have lower success
rates around 60%. In the second step, the classification
is repeated for all websites considered so far (whistle-
blowing and Alexa Top 30). Figure 5(a) illustrates the
success rates for all ML techniques. When classifying 40
websites, CNN yields a success rate of 68%, while SVM
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Figure 4: Success rate vs. number of training measure-
ments for Tor Browser and (a) 30 different websites (b)
10 same domain web pages.
achieves 55%. In contrast, kNN and DT algorithms can-
not classify the websites effectively. When the number
of guesses is increased, the success rate improves again.
Figure 5(b) shows the classification rates over an increas-
ing number of guesses. If only whistleblowing websites
and 5 guesses are considered, CNN yields a success close
to 100%. When all websites are considered, the success
rate of CNN is 89.25%. SVM achieves slightly worse
results.
Individual success rates for CNN are shown in Fig-
ure 6. The lowest success rate is around 20% for two
websites and seven websites are classified correctly with
100% accuracy. An interesting observation is that among
the 40 websites, the whistleblowing portals are still clas-
sified with good success rates. With an average suc-
cess rate of 68%, CNN is more capable than other ML
techniques to correctly classify websites opened in Tor
browser.
7 Discussion
The experiments on ARM were conducted with core-
wide measurements, whereas HPEs were acquired in a
process-specific fashion on Intel. In general, core-wide
acquisition is expected to introduce more noise in the
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Figure 5: (a) Success rate vs. number of training mea-
surements for Tor Browser and all websites. (b) Num-
ber of guesses vs. classification rate for whistleblowing
(dashed) and all websites (solid).
measurements, e.g. from system activity in the back-
ground. For process-specific acquisition the activity of
the rest of the system does not impede the measurements,
as the perf subsystem accumulates event counts only
for the specified process. According to the results pre-
sented in the previous section, however, both scenarios
allow to classify websites with success rates of over 80%
for SVM. Similarly, the precise synchronization on ARM
and the approximate process-scanning approach on Intel
are both suitable to achieve high classification rates.
Compared to Google Chrome in Incognito mode, the
results of the Tor Browser are in general worse. This
can be explained with the browser start-up phase, which
is always captured for Tor. Also, random network de-
lays introduce jitter in the observations of the website
loading. Another adverse effect is the changing geo-
location of the Tor exit nodes. Many websites, partic-
ularly news sites like New York Times and Yahoo, cus-
tomize their appearance based on the location of their
visitors and therefore introduce additional noise in the
measurements.
Among the Machine Learning techniques, Convolu-
tional Neural Networks have proven to be the most ca-
pable for classifying websites, if enough samples are
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available. This is the reason why CNNs performed well
in Google Chrome and Tor Browser experiments, but
not in ARM experiments. CNNs are built for multi-
classification of complex structures by extracting mean-
ingful features. On the contrary, SVM and kNN are
designed to create hyperplanes to separate space into
classes. Since the number of dimensions is high in the
experiments, it is difficult to find the best hyperplane for
each dimension. Nevertheless, there is a still need for
further studies on CNN, since the results could be im-
proved by modifying the parameters, number of layers
and neurons.
In general, the feasibility of website fingerprinting via
hardware performance events is not limited to the spe-
cific profiling scenarios and test platforms used in our
experiments. This is because loading different websites
creates different microarchitectural footprints. This a
logical consequence of optimized software that is de-
signed to provide best user experience. Therefore, sim-
ilar results are expected also for other x86 and ARM
processors, as well as for other HPE interfaces and web
browsers, unless mitigation strategies are implemented.
8 Countermeasures
The website inference technique presented in this work
has two main requirements. First, websites loaded by
a browser exhibit a unique footprint in the microarchi-
tectural state of a processor. Second, this state can be
observed via hardware performance events with suffi-
cient precision. Any efforts impacting these two require-
ments directly affect the reliability, success, or practical-
ity of our approach. The following two paragraphs sub-
sequently discuss such efforts, formulate possible coun-
termeasures, and approximately assess their feasibility.
Displaying Websites. The first requirement of our
classification technique implies that the executed oper-
ations during downloading and rendering of website ele-
ments are closely related to the type and amount of con-
tent displayed on a website. From a more abstract per-
spective this means that the execution flow and memory
accesses of the browser vary for different websites. A
thorough approach for solving this issue is writing code
such that instruction sequences and operand addresses
are independent of the input that is processed. While
this is reasonable to aspire for security software, it has
considerable practical drawbacks in the context of web
browsers. First, removing input dependencies almost al-
ways impairs performance, because runtime optimiza-
tions typically rely on skipping operations and handling
special cases differently. As a result, websites take longer
to display, which is not in favor of user experience. Sec-
ond, the larger the code, the more complex it gets to re-
move input dependencies. For web browsers, at least the
code related to networking, storing, and rendering ele-
ments must be changed. Given that security critical soft-
ware has much smaller code bases and still struggles to
remove input dependencies in practice [16], it is ques-
tionable that browser software will successfully imple-
ment this in the foreseeable future. If input dependen-
cies cannot be entirely removed, artificial noise can be
added to the website loading process. This is, for in-
stance, achieved by introducing random delays between
operations or by adding functions that process dummy
data instead of real inputs. While this does not solve
the underlying problem, it distorts the microarchitectural
footprint each website exhibits while being displayed.
Observing Events. The second requirement is the
ability to observe the state of the processor microachi-
tecture with high precision. Since performance moni-
toring units are dedicated parts of the processor, they
cannot simply be removed or permanently deactivated.
However, operating systems can block access to them
from the software side. On Linux, the kernel can be
compiled without the perf subsystem, e.g., by disabling
the CONFIG PERF EVENTS configuration option. Also,
the perf event paranoid file can be set to 3 or above
to disable event counter access from user space. How-
ever, blocking or deactivating perf impairs applica-
tions that use performance events for legitimate profil-
ing or debugging purposes. If event counting is gener-
ally needed, a possible compromise could be more fine-
grained profiling restrictions, such that processes can
only count events caused by themselves. Profiling any
other process is prohibited, even if it belongs to the same
user. While this requires changes to the perf inter-
face, it provides legitimate applications access to profil-
ing and at the same time impairs the fingerprinting tech-
nique presented in this work. This profiling restriction
could be conveniently added as a dedicated setting in the
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perf event paranoid configuration file. An alterna-
tive solution is to lower the measurement precision of
hardware performance events. This can, for instance, be
achieved by artificially adding a certain level of noise
to the event counts while retaining a sufficiently high
signal-to-noise ratio, or by reducing sampling frequen-
cies with which applications can acquire event counts.
Yet again, this would also affect benign applications.
A possible solution is to detect malicious programs and
then only degrade their observations. However, the pre-
sented measurement approach behaves identically to le-
gitimate applications and does not rely on exotic opera-
tions or measurement settings.
9 Conclusion
When websites are loaded in the browser, they stress the
underlying hardware in a distinct pattern that is closely
related to the contents of the website. This pattern is
reflected in the microarchitectural state of the proces-
sor that executes the browser, which can be observed
with high precision by counting hardware performance
events. Since these events can be legitimately mea-
sured by user space applications, it is feasible to infer
opened websites via performance event measurements.
We demonstrated this by utilizing Machine Learning
techniques, achieving high recognition rates even in the
presence of background noise, trace misalignment, and
varying network delays. In addition, the results show
that CNN is able to obtain better classification rates from
high number of classes in the presence of noise. By ap-
plying CNN, the whistleblowing websites are classified
with 79% accuracy among 40 websites while the overall
classification rate increases up to 89.25% with 5 guesses
in Tor browser.
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A List of Profiled Websites
Table 1: Websites profiled in this work. Entries 1-30 are
taken from the top websites listed by Alexa [4], while
URLs 31-40 are a selection of whistleblowing portals.
Website Number and URL
1) Netflix.com 21) Office.com
2) Amazon.com 22) Microsoftonline.com
3) Facebook.com 23) Chase.com
4) Google.com 24) Nytimes.com
5) Yahoo.com 25) Blogspot.com
6) Youtube.com 26) Paypal.com
7) Wikipedia.org 27) Imdb.com
8) Reddit.com 28) Wordpress.com
9) Twitter.com 29) Espn.com
10) Ebay.com 30) Wikia.com
11) Linkedin.com 31) Wikileaks.org
12) Diply.com 32) Aljazeera.com/investigations
13) Instagram.com 33) Balkanleaks.eu
14) Live.com 34) Unileaks.org
15) Bing.com 35) Globaleaks.com
16) Imgur.com 36) Liveleak.com
17) Ntd.tv 37) Globalwitness.org
18) Cnn.com 38) Wikispooks.com
19) Pinterest.com 39) Officeleaks.com
20) Tumblr.com 40) Publeaks.nl
13
